Tuesday, 10 March 2015

Critters that Move (Us): Lygia Clark’s Bichos

Here is a version of the presentation I am giving on an essay that I have written on Lygia Clark. 


Today I will be discussing the Brazilian Neoconcretist artist Lygia Clark’s series called “Bichos” which she began making in 1965. Just for a bit of background information, Neoconcretism was a movement beginning in the 1950s in Rio de Janeiro in response to the Sao Paolo Concretism group. For the Neoconcretists, the Sao Paolo movement focused too much on the theoretical and dogmatic aspects of geometric abstract art whereas their own focus was to restore a sense of expression in the production of art objects, or as they are sometimes called, instruments.

Clark’s Bichos have been translated to English as animal, beast or critter. They are composed of metal plates that are hinged together to create a mutable polymorphous sculpture, which can be held in the viewer’s hands. Its original design was such that it instructed the viewer to play with the Bicho by folding it to create new forms. For my essay, I was interested to see how we might approach the Bichos as having a certain agency as well as occupying a body. Some of the questions I want to ask are: What would we discover if we were to set aside what we already think we understand about the subjectivity of objects and of animals? What would a democratic, a more egalitarian, encounter between human and thing look like? If we were to consider technologies and objects as having bodies, how might this change the ways in which we approach the world as well as ourselves as humans?

The argument that I would like to put forward is that the Bicho is a subjective agent that behaves as an equal participant in the encounter between itself and the viewer. In such a meeting, wherein the viewer takes hold of the Bicho’s metallic limbs and moves them, she too is moved as a function of the distinct limitations of the physical structure of the given Bicho.

I begin my argument by exploring Bill Brown’s notion of the “thing” which he distinguishes from the object. For Brown, we don’t see objects, or as he puts it, we see through objects because of their cultural associations with a particular function. It is only when an object fails to function for humans and is rendered obsolete or inoperable that it asserts itself as an agential thing. Brown explains how a thing is a description of a subject-object relationship. In this way, a thing is born through its encounter with a viewer. While the Bicho may initially signify as a work of art, especially in the context of a gallery, the permission to touch it and play with it destabilizes the look-but-don’t-touch rule. In this sense, it stops being a typical artwork and asserts itself as a participant in the encounter, as a thing.

I go on to discuss how this encounter can be repeated again and again because of the multitude of forms that the Bicho can claim. In her discussion of the Bichos, Briony Fer argues that this kind of variability is dependent on the Bicho’s sensitivity to its surroundings and to the hands that manipulate it.

What I want to draw out here is the performability that is inherent in such an encounter. What I find particularly interesting here are the ways in which the subject also moves as she moves the Bicho. What I mean by this is that the joints of that particular Bicho dictate the subject’s physical disposition. In this way, there is a sort of harmonious dance that occurs when a viewer moves a Bicho and a Bicho consequently moves the viewer.

In another aspect that is crucial to my argument, I make use of Derrida’s text “The Animal That Therefore I Am”. In this context, I first discuss Derrida’s return to Genesis to recount how God instructs Adam to name the animals. Derrida explains that this power is a privilege reserved for man alone. Clark names her sculptures beasts, animals or critters but does not provide any further specification, only tells us that they belong to this category. Because of the polymorphic and mutable nature of the Bichos, they can never resemble a specific animal long enough to be named after it. In this way, by refraining from specifying the Bichos more acutely, Clark decidedly does not participate in the violence inherent in the human methods of ordering living things into a hierarchy. Instead of subjugating her Bichos to the dominating power described by Derrida, by titling her work in this way, as well as facilitating a respectful exchange between the human subject and the Bicho, Clark draws attention to the human as animal as well as to the animal as subject.

I briefly discuss Donna Haraway’s section on critters in her book When Species Meet. Interestingly enough, Haraway equates the critter with the thing. For Haraway however, things are material and specific. Alternatively, I suggest that the very quality that makes an object a thing is its inability to be specific, its abstractness. In the case of the Bichos, this is twofold: firstly, it is not specific because of its changeable and ever-changing form and secondly, because it is named a critter and not anything more descriptive or concrete. Haraway also proposes that things never function alone but are compound and interact with other things in the world. If this is true then things function as a component that contributes to a larger assemblage of active agents. In other words, the thing collaborates with the viewer in order to come into its thingness and to create an encounter that challenges the hierarchy of bodies, whether animal, thing or human.

The last section of my essay discusses the recent curatorial decisions and exhibition strategies of the Bichos in the exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery called “Adventures of the Black Square”. In this show, the Bichos are shown on a plinth inside a clear display case. By enclosing the critter in this way, its ability to interact with the viewer is so compromised that its previous generative potential to produce meaning and to move the viewer as the viewer moves it is utterly lost and rendered sterile. The ability to play with the Bicho is vital not only to the viewer’s conception of it as thing, as animal, but also to the animation of it as an agent in motion.  


Image from: https://historiasdasartes.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/23-bicho-de-bolso-lygia-clark.jpg



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